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Uncertainty and preference is often modeled using lin-
ear previsions and linear orders. Some more expressive
models use sets of probabilities, lower previsions, or par-
tial orders (see, e.g., Seidenfeld et al., 1990; Walley, 1991).
In the discussion of these more expressive models, or even
to justify them, alternative representations in terms of sets
of so-called acceptable, favorable, or desirable gambles
appear (cf. Williams, 1974, 1975; Seidenfeld et al., 1990;
Walley, 1991, 2000). Such ‘sets of gambles’-based models
are attractive because of their geometric nature.
We generalize these ‘sets of gambles’-based models by
considering a pair of sets, one with accepted gambles and
one with rejected gambles. We develop a framework based
on a small number of axioms and provide an interesting
characterization of the resulting models. Furthermore, we
define a pair of equivalent gamble relations that generalize
the partial orders mentioned earlier; the corresponding
characterization result is also given.
Accepting & Rejecting Gambles Consider an agent
faced with uncertainty, formalized using a linear space ℒ
of gambles with payoffs expressed in units of a linear
precise utility. We envisage an elicitation procedure where
the agent is asked to state whether he would accept a
gamble—and its possibly negative outcome—, reject it—
if he considers it unreasonable to accept—, or remain
uncommitted.
The agent’s set of acceptable gambles is 𝒜⪰; the set
of gambles he rejects is 𝒜≺. They form his assessment𝒜 ∶= ∐︀𝒜⪰;𝒜≺̃︀; the set of all assessments is A ∶= 2ℒ×2ℒ.
In terms of statements, a gamble f can fall into one of
four categories: only accepted, only rejected, unresolved—
neither accepted nor rejected; 𝒜⌣ ∶=ℒ∖(𝒜⪰∪𝒜≺)—, or
confusing—both accepted and rejected.
Derived statements Given an assessment 𝒜 in A, we
can introduce three other types of statements by consider-
ing both a gamble and its (pointwise) negation.
The agent is indifferent about a gamble f if he finds
both it and its negation − f acceptable; 𝒜≃ ∶=𝒜⪰∩−𝒜⪰.1
1 −𝒦 ∶= {−g ∶ g ∈𝒦}.
The agent finds a gamble f favorable if he finds it accept-
able, but rejects its negation − f ; 𝒜» ∶=𝒜⪰∩−𝒜≺. A gam-
ble f is incomparable if both it and its negation − f are
unresolved; 𝒜≍ ∶=𝒜⌣∩−𝒜⌣.
No Confusion We judge confusion to be a situation
that has to be avoided. This corresponds to the following
axiom:
No Confusion: 𝒜⪰∩𝒜≺ =∅. (1)
The set of assessments without confusion is denoted by A.
Deductive Closure Based on the assumption that the
gamble payoffs are expressed in a linear precise utility
scale, statements of acceptance imply other statements,
generated by positive scaling and addition. This is called
deductive extension. Starting from an assessment 𝒜 in A,
its deductive extension is ∐︀posi𝒜⪰;𝒜≺̃︀.2
Deductively closed assessments𝒟 satisfy the following
axiom:
Deductive Closure: posi𝒟⪰ =𝒟⪰. (2)
The subset of A consisting of all deductively closed as-
sessments is denoted by D and those without confusion
by D ∶=D∩A.
No Limbo Deductive Closure does have more of an im-
pact than is apparent at first sight. Consider a deductively
closed assessment 𝒟 in D that is the deductive extension
of the agent’s assessment. It can be shown that under De-
ductive Closure, the gambles in (𝒟≺∖𝒟⪰)−(𝒟⪰∪{0})
have exactly the same effect as gambles in 𝒟≺:3 con-
sidering them acceptable increases confusion. We call((𝒟≺∖𝒟⪰)−(𝒟⪰∪{0}))∖𝒟≺ the limbo of 𝒟.
Starting from a deductively closed assessment 𝒟 in D,
additionally rejecting the gambles that are in its limbo
results in its reckoning extension
∐︁𝒟⪰;𝒟≺∪((𝒟≺∖𝒟⪰)−(𝒟⪰∪{0}))̃︁,
2 posi𝒦 ∶=⋃{∑g∈𝒦′ λg ⋅g ∶𝒦′ ⊆𝒦∧ ⋃︀𝒦′⋃︀ ∈N∧λ ∈R𝒦′>0}.
3 𝒦 ∶=⋃ f ∈𝒦{λ f ∶ λ ∈R>0} and 𝒦+𝒦′ ∶= {g+h ∶ g ∈𝒦∧h ∈𝒦′}.
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which we call a model. So models ℳ are deductively
closed assessments that satisfy the following axiom:
No Limbo: (ℳ≺∖ℳ⪰)−(ℳ⪰∪{0}) ⊆ℳ≺. (3)
The subset of A consisting of all models is denoted by M
and those without confusion by M ∶=M∩A.
Indifference to Status Quo We judge it reasonable
to always let the zero gamble 0—also called status quo—
be acceptable, and therefore indifferent. This corresponds
to the following axiom:
Indifference to Status Quo: 0 ∈𝒜⪰. (4)
The set of assessments satisfying Indifference to Status
Quo is denoted by A0 (similarly, M0 etc.).
Main characterization result Given ℳ in A, thenℳ ∈M0 if and only if
(i) 0 ∈ℳ⪰,
(ii) 0 ∉ℳ≺,
(iii) posiℳ⪰ =ℳ⪰,
(iv) ℳ≺−ℳ⪰ ⊆ℳ≺.
Gamble Relations We associate a pair of gamble rela-
tions on ℒ×ℒ with each model ℳ in M𝒪:
f ⪰ g⇔ f −g ∈ℳ⪰ and f ≺ g⇔ f −g ∈ℳ≺. (5)
The former can be read as ‘ f is accepted in exchange
for g’, the latter as ‘ f is dispreferred to g’.
The two definitions of Equation (5) engender three
other useful gamble relations: The agent is indifferent
between two gambles f and g if he accepts f in exchange
for g and vice versa: f ≃ g⇔ f ⪰ g∧g ⪰ f ⇔ f −g ∈ℳ≃.
The agent prefers a gamble f over a gamble g if he
both accepts f in exchange for g and disprefers g to f :
f » g⇔ f ⪰ g∧g ≺ f ⇔ f −g ∈ℳ». Two gambles f and g
are incomparable when neither of their differences is re-
solved: f ≍ g⇔ f −g ∈ℳ≍.
Characterization result for gamble relations The
nature of these gamble relations follows from the axioms
of the accept-reject framework. We here give a translation
of these axioms for gamble relations under the form of a
characterization: Given gamble relations ⪰ and ≺ on ℒ×ℒ,
then these are (5)-equivalent to a model ℳ in M0 if and
only if for all f , g, and h in ℒ and 0 < µ ≤ 1 it holds that
(i) Accept Reflexivity: f ⪰ f ,
(ii) Reject Irreflexivity: f ⊀ f ,
(iii) Accept Transitivity: f ⪰ g∧g ⪰ h⇒ f ⪰ h,
(iv) Mixed Transitivity: f ≺ g∧h ⪰ g⇒ f ≺ h,
(v) Mixture independence:
f ⪰ g⇔ µ ⋅ f +(1−µ) ⋅h ⪰ µ ⋅g+(1−µ) ⋅h,
f ≺ g⇔ µ ⋅ f +(1−µ) ⋅h ≺ µ ⋅g+(1−µ) ⋅h.
So acceptability is a non-strict preorder and dispref-
erence is irreflexive; they are linked together by Mixed
Transitivity. Because it is the symmetrization of accept-
ability ⪰, indifference ≃ is an equivalence relation. Prefer-
ence » can be verified to be a strict partial ordering, which
makes it suited for decision making. Incomparability ≍ is
by definition symmetric.
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